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Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of the recent technical change on the
labor market and explains the observed diﬀerences in wage inequality
among advanced countries. In particular, we focus on the diﬀerence
between the wage inequality in the U.S. and continental Europe. By
introducing human capital investment into Acemoglu (1999)’s model,
we show that ex ante homogeneous economies would have distinct ex
post wage inequality. In addition, we show that the diﬀerences in tax
or education system can explain the diﬀerence in wage inequality be-
tween the U.S. and Europe.
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There is a large body of literature that indicates a rise in wage inequality
in the U.S. during the past three decades. For instance, Goldin and Katz
(1999) show that the time series of wage inequality in the U.S. over the past
100 years forms a “U-shape” and that the present level of inequality is at a
historical peak in the postwar period. According to Katz and Autor (1999),
various indices such as the 90-10 weekly wage ratio, the standard deviation
of log wage, and the Gini coeﬃcient conﬁrm that the rise in wage inequality
in the U.S. started in the early 1970s. As indicated by Acemoglu (2002), the
rise in wage inequality involved both the rise in the incomes of the workers
at the top and the fall in the incomes of those at the bottom.
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show that in continental Europe, there
is little change in wage inequality.1 Table 1 shows the trends in earning
dispersion among advanced countries, and it is clear that there is a contrast
between Europe and the U.S.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the recent
technical change and the observed diﬀerences in income distribution among
advanced countries. There is a consensus that technical changes such as the
development of information technology increase the relative productivity of
skilled workers to unskilled workers.2 Motivated by these empirical studies,
Acemoglu (1999) provides the model in which skill-biased technical change
causes a drastic change in the employment structure, which increases the
wages of skilled workers and collapses the employment of unskilled workers.
The explanation of his model applies suitably to the observations in the U.S.
However, the recent technical change has not occured only in the U.S. Why
have the European countries not experienced the spread of inequality?
In order to access this question, we extend Acemoglu’s model by intro-
ducing human capital investment. We assume that both ﬁrms and work-
ers must decide their capacity before they enter the labor market.3 Since
search friction prevents them from knowing their partners in advance, there
is strategic complementarity between the investment by ﬁrms and workers.
That is, large investment by ﬁrms enhances their incentive to educate their
workers and vice versa. Due to the strategic complementarity, there is a
possibility that multiple equilibria exist, which explains the diﬀerence of
1Machin (1996) only shows that the trend in the U.K. is similar to that in the U.S.
The U.K. economy has exhibited a rise in wage inequality that was similar to that in the
U.S. economy.
2For instance, see Krueger (1993), Autor et al. (1998), and Berman et al. (1998).
3In Acemoglu’s model, the skill of workers is assumed to be exogenous.income distribution between the U.S. and Europe.
The conclusions of this paper are as follows. First, like Acemoglu (1999),
we ﬁnd that the development of skill-biased technical change gradually in-
creases the relative wage of skilled workers in the beginning. If the diﬀerence
in productivity between skilled and unskilled workers becomes suﬃciently
large, a drastic change in the employment structure occurs and all unskilled
workers lose their jobs. Second, contrary to Acemoglu, we ﬁnd that the
occurence of such a change is indeterminate if the diﬀerence in productivity
is intermediate. Thus, we can explain the diﬀerence in income distribution
without assuming fundamental heterogeneity. Third, taxation on labor pre-
vents a drastic change. Fourth, the eﬀect of one type education policy on
income distribution may be opposite to that of another. While investment
in primary education increases the productivity of unskilled workers and
prevents a drastic change, scholarships for higher education promote such a
change. These results are consistent with the observed features of the U.S.
and European economies.
This paper investigates the interaction of technical change with institu-
tional factors in the frictional labor market. Thus it is related to studies such
as Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2008), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999),
and Hornstein et al. (2007). However, the focus of these studies is on the
rise in unemployment in Europe relative to the U. S., whereas this paper
focuses on the diﬀerence in the change in income distribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the structure of the model. Section 3 solves the model and ﬁnds Nash equi-
libria. We show that there exist two types of equilibria – pooling equilib-
rium and separating equilibrium. We also show that a skill-biased technical
change causes a switch from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilib-
rium in the economy. Section 4 considers the diﬀerences in labor market
institutions. We can attribute the diﬀerence in income distribution between
the U.S. and Europe to their institutional diﬀerences. Section 5 discusses
the limitation of the model. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and comments
on the conclusions of the paper.
2 The Basic Model
In this section, we describe the framework of the model. The basic structure
of the model is the same as that of Acemoglu (1999) with the exception that
human capital investment is endogenized in our model. In a labor market,
there are continuums of risk-neutral workers and proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.Each measure is normalized to one. All ﬁrms are ex ante homogeneous.
Production takes place in one ﬁrm-one worker pairs; however, agents do not
know their partners in advance due to the existence of search friction. All
pairs produce homogeneous consumption goods. The economy lasts for two
periods and the timing of events is as follows. First, both workers and ﬁrms
irreversibly determine their capacities i.e., the amount of “human capital”
and “physical capital”, respectively. Second, both workers and ﬁrms enter
the labor market and meet their partners randomly. They are able to observe
their partners’ capacity when they meet and decide whether or not to form
a pair and engage in production.
Although ﬁrms must determine the amount of physical capital, k, before
they enter the labor market, they need not to incur the associated cost if
they do not produce with the worker in the second period. However, if ﬁrms
produce with the worker in the second period, they must incur a cost, ck.
Workers also must decide whether or not to acquire skill in the ﬁrst
period. We assume that the workers are ex ante heterogeneous with respect
to the costs of acquiring skill. The continuous function G(¢) represents the
distribution of cost measured by consumption goods. Let ¿(¢) be the inverse
of this function, and suppose that it satisﬁes
¿0 > 0; ¿(0) = 0; ¿(1) = 1: (1)
We can interpret ¿(µ) as the cost of acquiring skill for the worker for whom
the fraction of more capable workers is µ. (1) implies that the most capable
worker can acquire skill without incuring a cost and that the least capable
worker cannot acqurie skill. We normalize the human capital of unskilled
workers to one and denote that of skilled workers as ´ > 1. The productivity
of a pair comprising the worker with human capital h and the ﬁrm with
physical capital k is given by
y(h;k) = k1¡®h®: (2)
The ﬁrm and the worker determine the wage through Nash bargaining
after they agree that they form a pair. Therefore, capital cost ck has already
sunk at the stage of wage determination. Let ¯ denote the bargaining power
of workers. Then, the wages of skilled workers, wH(k), and those of unskilled
workers, wL(k), satisfy
wH(k) = ¯k1¡®´® and wL(k) = ¯k1¡®:
Note that wages depend on the amount of capital of the ﬁrm. To simplifythe algebra, we normalize c = (1 ¡ ¯).
The expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm depends on the hiring strategy and the
amount of physical capital. Let xi be the probability that a ﬁrm produces
with a worker of type i = H;L, conditional on matching with this worker.
Then, the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm with physical capital k can be written
as
V (k;xH;xL) = ÁxH(1¡¯)[k1¡®´®¡k]+(1¡Á)xL(1¡¯)[k1¡®¡k]; (3)
where Á is the fraction of skilled workers, which is an endogenous variable
in our model. Note that workers accept any pair since their payoﬀs are zero
if they fail to form a pair.
Human capital investment depends on education cost and the wage dif-
ference between skilled and unskilled workers. The worker whose education
cost is ¿ chooses to be skilled if the expected wage diﬀerence is higher than







Similarly, the worker chooses to be unskilled if the expected wage diﬀerence







where F(k) is the distribution of physical capital that ﬁrms choose and K is
the support of this distribution. We denote the probability of adoption as a
function of k since in an equilibrium, ﬁrms with the same amount of capital
choose the same hiring strategies.
Since ¿(Á) is continuous and increasing, there is a worker who is indif-
ferent between acquiring skill and not. In an equilibrium, the fraction of






xL(k)wL(k)dF(k) = ¿(Á): (4)
We deﬁne the equilibrium as the set fÁ;F(k);xH(k);xL(k)g that sat-
isﬁes the following conditions. First, given the distribution of capital and
probability of adoption, thr educational choices of workers must be optimal,
i.e., condition (4) must hold. Second, ﬁrms choose the amount of physical
capital and the probability of adoption to maximize their expected proﬁtrepresented by (3). Therefore, the following condition must hold in an equi-
librium.




We consider the best responses of ﬁrms and workers in turn. Suppose that
ﬁrms employ unskilled workers when they are indiﬀerent between employing
them and not. Then, we obatin the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given the fraction of skilled workers, Á, the best response strate-
gies of ﬁrms are as follows:
´ · Γ(Á) ) argmaxV (k;xH;xL) = (kP;1;1); (6)
where kP = a[Á´® + (1 ¡ Á)]
1
®
´ > Γ(Á) ) argmaxV (k;xH;xL) = (kS;1;0); (7)






® and a ´ (1 ¡ ®)
1
®.
Proof. See Acemoglu (1999).
Since Γ(¢) is a decreasing function, Lemma 1 implies that the higher frac-
tion of skilled workers or the higher relative productivity of skilled workers
discourages ﬁrms from employing unskilled workers. In these cases, produc-
tion with an unskilled worker is not proﬁtable since ﬁrms have chosen large
physical capital in order to target only skilled workers.
Since ﬁrms are homogeneous, all ﬁrms choose the pooling strategy, (kP;1;1),
if ´ · Γ(Á). In this case, the distribution of physical capital and the proba-
bility of adoption are given by
K = fkPg;xH(kP) = 1;xL(kP) = 1: (8)
Similarly, if ´ > Γ(Á), we have
K = fkSg;xH(kS) = 1;xL(kS) = 0: (9)
In both cases, the distribution of capital stock is singleton because all ﬁrms
choose the same strategy in an equilibrium.Next, we consider the best responses of workers. In an equilibrium,
the distribution of capital is (8) or (9). Suppose that all ﬁrms choose the
separating strategy, (kS;1;0). Then, workers decide whether or not to be
skilled given that the distribution of capital satisﬁes (9). In this case, the
optimal education condition, which is represented by (4), becomes
¿(Á) = ¯a1¡®´ ´ !S(´); (10)
where !S(´) is the expected wage diﬀerential when all ﬁrms choose the
separating strategy. Since ¿(¢) is strictly increasing and satisﬁes ¿(0) = 0
and ¿(1) = 1, equation (10) has a unique solution (see Figure 1). Let ÁS(´)
denote the fraction of skilled workers that solves (10). Then, we have
ÁS(´) = G ± !S(´): (11)
Note that the solution of equation (10) depends on the relative productivity
of skilled workers. Whether or not the pair of ﬁrms’ separating strategies
and workers’ educational choices represented by (11) forms the equilibrium
depends on the relative productivity of skilled workers. We deﬁne the thresh-
old, ´¤, which satisﬁes 4
´¤ = Γ(ÁS(´¤)):
Since Á0
S(¢) > 0 and Γ0(¢) < 0, we have ´ > Γ(ÁS(´)) for any ´ > ´¤.
Therefore, whenever ´ > ´¤, choosing the separating strategy is optimal
for ﬁrms given that workers’ strategies are represented by (11). That is,
workers’ and ﬁrms’ strategies are mutually optimal. Hence, a strategy proﬁle
represented by fÁS;K = fkSg;xH = 1;xL = 0g is a Nash equilibrium if
´ > ´¤. We call this type of equilibrium a separating equilibrium. Next,
we consider the case where all ﬁrms choose the pooling strategy (kP;1;1).
Then, the optimal education condition becomes
¯(kP)1¡®´® ¡ ¿(Á) = ¯(kP)1¡®
, ¿(Á) = ¯a1¡®[Á´® + (1 ¡ Á)]
1¡®
® (´® ¡ 1) ´ !P(Á;´);
(12)
where !P(Á;´) is the expected wage diﬀerential when all ﬁrms choose the
pooling strategy. Since ¿(0) < !(0;´) and ¿(1) > !(1;´) for any ´ > 1,
equation (12) has at least one solution. We assume that equation (12) has a
4Since Γ
0 < 0;G
0 > 0;limÁ!0 Γ(Á) = 1 and limÁ!1 Γ(Á) = 1=a, ´
¤ > 0 exists uniquely.
We suppose that ´
¤ > 1.unique solution for any ´ and denote it as ÁP(´).5 Then, we can show that
Á0
P(´) > 0 and
8´ > 1 ÁP(´) < ÁS(´): (13)
That is, more workers acquire skill when all ﬁrms choose the separating
strategy than when they choose the pooling strategy. This is because the
expected wage diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled workers is always
higher in the former case, i.e.,
8´ > 1 8Á 2 (0;1) !P(Á;´) < !S(´): (14)
As in the case of a separating equilibrium, we deﬁne ´¤¤ by 6
´¤¤ = Γ(ÁP(´¤¤)):
Then, we have ´ · Γ(ÁP(´)) for any ´ · ´¤¤. Therefore, a strategy pro-
ﬁle represented by fÁP;K = kP;xH = 1;xL = 1g is a Nash equilibrium
whenever ´ · ´¤¤. We call this type of equilibrium a pooling equilibrium.
Figure 2 depicts the boundary that divides the ﬁrms’ optimal strategies,
Γ(Á), and the fractions of skilled workers, ÁS(´) and ÁP(´), which are results
of workers’ optimal responses to the separating strategy and the pooling
strategy, respectively. Note that the ÁS(´) curve always lies on the right
of the ÁP(´) curve. Thus, their intersections with the Γ(Á) curve, which
correspond to ´¤¤ and ´¤, respectively, satisfy ´¤ < ´¤¤.
As we have seen, a set fÁS;K = kS;xH = 1;xL = 0g satisﬁes the equi-
librium condition if ´ > ´¤ and a set fÁP;K = kP;xH = 1;xL = 1g satisﬁes
the equilibrium condition if ´ · ´¤¤. Therefore, we have at least one equi-
librium for any ´ > 1, and we have multiple equilibria if ´ 2 (´¤;´¤¤]. The
possibility that multiple equilibria exist is due to the strategic complemen-
tarity between ﬁrms’ and workers’ strategies. If all ﬁrms choose separating
(pooling) strategies, more (less) workers acquire skill, which enhances the
incentive for ﬁrms to choose separating (pooling) strategies. The following
proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. A Nash equilibrium always exists. When the relative pro-
ductivity of skilled workers is suﬃciently high, ´ > ´¤, there is a separating
5We consider the more general case that the equation (12) has multiple solutions in
Appendix A. While we would have multiple pooling equilibria in the general case, the
main results in this paper hold.
6By the same argument in the case of ´
¤, we can show that ´
¤¤ exists uniquely. From
(14), we have ´
¤ < ´
¤¤ (see Figure 2).equilibrium. When the relative productivity is suﬃciently low, ´ · ´¤¤, there
is a pooling equilibrium. If the level of the relative productivity is interme-
diate, ´ 2 (´¤;´¤¤], both types of equilibria exist.
The features of each type of equilibrium are the same as those in Ace-
moglu (1999). In a pooling equilibrium, all ﬁrms employ both types of
workers with probability one and choose the amount of capital stock that is
suitable for both types of workers. Hence, there is no unemployment and the
wage diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled workers is lower than that in
the Walrasian equilibrium. 7
In a separating equilibrium, all ﬁrms create high-quality jobs for skilled
workers and refuse to employ unskilled workers. Hence, the earnings and
employment of the unskilled workers collapse in a separating equilibrium.
The wages of skilled workers, wH
sep, are higher than those in a pooling equi-











In what follows, we analyze the eﬀect of skill-biased technical change
on income distribution. Proposition 1 shows that the distribution of skill,
income, and employment depends on the level of relative productivity of
skilled workers. We consider the case in which the relative productivity is
suﬃciently low and a pooling equilibrium is realized. In such a case, an
increase in relative productivity caused by the skill-biased technical change
always ampliﬁes the wage inequality. However, the wages of unskilled work-
ers also increase if the rise in relative productivity does not involve “the
switch of equilibrium” from pooling equilibrium to separating equilibrium.
This is because the rise in relative productivity increases the amount of
capital stock that unskilled workers can use.8 On the contrary, when the
rise in relative productivity involves the switch of equilibrium, i.e., it takes
the economy from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium, the





pool denote the wages of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively,










wage of skilled workers, ´
®, is lower than the relative wage in the Walrasian equilibrium,
´, which is equal to the relative productivity.
8An increase in relative productivity raises the level of capital stock, k
P, because it
increases the expected marginal productivity of physical capital. This is due to both the
increase in productivity of skilled workers and the increase in the fraction of skilled workers.
The latter eﬀect is due to endogenous human capital investment; hence, Acemoglu’s model
does not have such an eﬀect.collapses.
Whether the switch occurs or not is indeterminate because the condition
that ´ exceeds ´¤ is not suﬃcient for the switch to occur. If ´ is smaller
than ´¤¤, the switch would not happen since both types of equilibria can
be present in such cases. In other words, it is indeterminate whether the
switch of equilibrium occurs when the relative productivity of skilled workers
is intermediate. Therefore, even if the skill-biased technical change causes
a drastic rise in wage inequality in an economy, the same type of technical
change does not necessarily bring about a similar change in another econ-
omy as long as the technical change is not so drastic. Hence, our discussion
can provide an answer to the question as to why the technical shock yields
the ex post heterogeneity in income distribution among ex ante homoge-
neous economies. Note that this result depends on the existence of multiple
equilibria; hence, Acemoglu’s model does not lead to this result.
4 Labor Market Institutions and Inequality
In the previous section, we analyze the mechanism that ex ante homoge-
neous economies can attain extremely diﬀerent income distribution. How-
ever, there are various diﬀerences between the U.S. and Europe. Therefore,
it seems natural to inquire how the ex ante heterogeneity aﬀects income
distribution. In this section, we consider the eﬀect of tax and education
system on income distribution in order to answer this question.
4.1 Taxes on Labor
We introduce taxes on labor into the model. We assume that there is a
proportional tax on labor; hence the cost of hiring a worker for ﬁrms, wf,
does not coincide with the wage that the worker receives,
w = (1 ¡ t)wf; (15)
where w is the disposable income of workers and t is the tax wedge. Table
2, which shows the tax wedges of the advanced countries, indicates that tax
rates in Europe are higher than those in North America. Since a worker and
a ﬁrm divide the total surplus that is realized by the matching, y ¡wf +w,
by Nash bargaining, we have
w = ¯(y ¡ wf + w): (16)From (15) and (16), we have
w =
¯(1 ¡ t)y
(1 ¡ t) + ¯t
and wf =
¯y
(1 ¡ t) + ¯t
:
Then, we modify the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm as follows:
˜ V (k;xH;xL) =ÁxH(1 ¡ ¯)
·
(1 ¡ t)k1¡®´®
(1 ¡ t) + ¯t
¡ k
¸
+ (1 ¡ Á)xL(1 ¡ ¯)
·
(1 ¡ t)k1¡®




By the same argument as that in the previous section, we arrive at the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given Á 2 (0;1), the best response strategies of ﬁrms are as
follows:
´ · Γ(Á) ) argmax ˜ V (k;xH;xL) = (˜ kP;1;1);
where ˜ kP = a
·
(1 ¡ t)
(1 ¡ t) + ¯t
¸ 1
®
[Á´® + (1 ¡ Á)]
1
®
´ > Γ(Á) ) argmax ˜ V (k;xH;xL) = (˜ kS;1;0);
where ˜ kS = a´
·
(1 ¡ t)




Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 implies that the boundary that divides ﬁrms’ optimal strategies
is the same as that in the previous section. This is because the ratio of the
expected proﬁt of ﬁrms when they choose the separating strategy to that
when they choose the pooling strategy does not depend on tax rate. The
optimal amount of capital is decreasing in tax rate; hence a higher tax rate
reduces the investment by ﬁrms.
We deﬁne ˜ ÁS and ˜ ÁP as the fraction of skilled workers in the case when all
ﬁrms choose the separating strategy and the pooling strategy, respectively.
Hence, ˜ ÁS solves
¿(Á) = ¯a1¡®´f(1 ¡ t)=[(1 ¡ t) + ¯t]g
1
®; (17)and ˜ ÁP solves9
¿(Á) = ¯a1¡®f(1 ¡ t)=[(1 ¡ t) + ¯t]g
1
®[Á´® + (1 ¡ Á)]
1¡®
® (´® ¡ 1): (18)
Since (1 ¡ t)=(1 ¡ t + ¯t) is decreasing in t, ˜ ÁS and ˜ ÁP are decreasing in t.
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A Nash equilibrium always exists. If ´ > ˜ ´¤, there is
a separating equilibrium. If ´ · ˜ ´¤¤, there is a pooling equilibrium. If
´ 2 (˜ ´¤; ˜ ´¤¤], both types of equilibria exist. Here, ˜ ´¤ and ˜ ´¤¤ are deﬁned by
˜ ´¤ = Γ(˜ ÁS(˜ ´¤)); ˜ ´¤¤ = Γ(˜ ÁP(˜ ´¤¤)):
A higher tax rate makes the condition under which a separating equilibrium
exists more restrictive and makes the condition under which a pooling equi-
librium exists less restrictive.
4.2 Policy on Education
Next, we consider the eﬀects of educational policies. Here, we analyze two
types of policies, investment in primary education and scholarships.
Since investment in primary education increases the productivity of un-
skilled workers, it has the same eﬀect as the decrease in the relative pro-
ductivity of skilled workers.10 Therefore, the model predicts that a pooling
equilibrium is realized in the economy where the quality of primary edu-
cation is high. Table 3, which shows the average literacy test scores by
education level, indicates that the less-educated workers in Germany, Swe-
den, and the Netherlands are more capable than those in the U.S. Freeman
and Schettkat (2001) also show that the variance of income and skill in Ger-
many is smaller than that in the U. S. These observations are consistent
with the prediction of the model.
Pecuniary assistance for higher education, such as scholarships, reduces
the cost of skill acquisition. Hence, it increases the fraction of skilled workers
given ﬁrms’ strategies. Therefore, the eﬀect of this policy on income distri-
bution is the opposite of that of investment in primary education. That is, a
separating equilibrium is realized in the economy where workers can receive
suﬃcient scholarships.
9We assume that equation (18) has a unique solution.
10While this policy also increases the productivity of skilled workers, it seems natural
to assume that it reduces the diﬀerence of the productivity between skilled and unskilled
workers.5 Discussion
Thus far, we have focused on the diﬀerence in income distribution between
the U.S. and Europe and have provided an explanation for the inequality.
However, the result that the unemployment rate in a pooling equilibrium
is lower than that in a separating equilibrium is not consistent with the
facts. Table 4, which presents the transitions in unemployment rates from
1973 to 2002 in advanced countries, shows that unemployment rates in the
countries that have experienced a rise in inequality are lower than those in
the countries that have had greater equality during the past two decades.
We think that a clue to solving this problem is the fact that the expected
proﬁt in a separating equilibrium is higher than that in a pooling equilibrium
if both types of equilibria exist. This result can be explained by the following
steps. First, the expected proﬁt in a separating equilibrium must be larger
than that in the case where the ﬁrm chooses the pooling strategy and the
fraction of skilled workers is ÁS. This is obvious by the deﬁnition of Nash
equilibrium. Second, the fraction of skilled workers in separating equilibrium
is larger than that in a pooling equilibrium. Third, the expected proﬁt in
the case where the ﬁrm chooses the pooling strategy is increasing in the
fraction of skilled workers. By these steps, we obtain the above mentioned
result.
The diﬀerence in the expected proﬁt could make the number of ﬁrms
in a separating equilibrium larger than that in a pooling equilibrium if we
endogenize the number of ﬁrms and the probability that each agent meets
their partner as in the standard search model (e.g., Pissarides (2000)).11
If the increase in the number participants in the labor market leads to an
increase in the number of meeting, the entry of new ﬁrms decreases the
unemployment rate given the hiring policies of ﬁrms. Therefore, the large
number of ﬁrms in a separating equilibrium could make the unemployment
rate lower than that in a pooling equilibrium.
However, endogenizing the number of ﬁrms makes the model more com-
plicated because it yields another strategic complementarity between the
educational choice of workers and the entry decisions of ﬁrms. Since the
aim of this paper is to study the diﬀerence in income distribution, we leave
the analysis in the diﬀerence of unemployment rates for further research.
11Note that in our model each agent can meet their partner with probability one even
though they cannot always match with their partner.6 Concluding Remarks
We now summarize the result of this paper and mention the possibility of
further research.
There are two types of equilibria in the model. In a pooling equilibrium,
the wage diﬀerential is relatively low and all workers are employed. In a sep-
arating equilibrium, unskilled workers are unemployed, and skilled workers
gain higher wages than that is realized in pooling equilibrium. Proposition
1 states that the type of equilibrium that is realized depends on the rela-
tive productivity of skilled workers. A pooling equilibrium is realized when
the relative productivity is suﬃciently small and a separating equilibrium is
realized when the relative productivity is suﬃciently large. If the relative
productivity is intermediate, there are multiple equilibria. Since the skill-
biased technical change, which is regarded as one of the causes of the recent
wage inequality, increases the relative productivity of skilled workers, it can
cause a shift from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium in the
economy. However, whether or not a drastic change occurs is indeterminate
when the rise in the relative productivity is not very large. As a result, the
same type of tehcnical shock can result in diﬀerent income distribution and
employment structures ex post in ex ante homogeneous economies. High
tax rates or high productivity of unskilled workers, which are observed in
European economies, prevent the switch of equilibrium. Therefore we can
regard these factors as the cause of the diﬀerence in the wage inequality
between the U.S. and Europe.
While this paper provides an explanation for the observed diﬀerence in
income distribution, the analysis of the diﬀerence in unemployment is a topic
for further research.
Appendix
A. Multiple Pooling Equilibria
In Section 3, although we assume that equation (12) has a unique solution,
this assumption is not crucial to the main result. Here, we consider the more
general case in which equation (12) may have multiple solutions.
Let Φp(´) be the set of solutions of (12) when the relative productivity
is ´. We deﬁne Á(´) and Á(´) by
¿(Á(´)) = !P(0;´); ¿(Á(´)) = !P(1;´):Since !P(Á;´) is increasing in Á and !P(1;´) < !S(´), we have
8´ > 1 8Á 2 ΦP(´) Á(´) < Á < Á(´) < ÁS(´):
As in Section 3, we deﬁne ´ and ´ by ´ = Γ(Á(´)) and ´ = Γ(Á(´)). Note
that ´ > ´ > ´¤ because Á(´) < Á(´) < ÁS(´) for any ´. By the same
argument as that in Section 3, we have
8Á 2 ΦP(´) ´ · ´ = Γ(Á(´)) · Γ(Á(´)) < Γ(Á)
if ´ · ´. Therefore, the pair of any solution of equation (12) and the pooling
strategy is a Nash equilibrium if ´ · ´. On the other hand, we have
8Á 2 ΦP(´) ´ > ´ = Γ(Á(´)) > Γ(Á(´)) > Γ(Á)
if ´ > ´. Thus, we have no pooling equilibrium when ´ exceeds ´. By
summarizing these results, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. A Nash equilibrium always exists even if we allow the pos-
sibility that more than one pooling equilibrum exists. When the relative
productivity of skilled workers is suﬃciently high, ´ > ´¤, there is a sepa-
rating equilibrium. When the relative productivity is suﬃciently low, ´ · ´,
there is at least one pooling equilibrium. If the level of relative productivity
is intermediate, ´ 2 (´¤;´], both types of equilibria exist. There is no pooling
equilibrium if ´ > ´.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We consider the optimal investment problem of the ﬁrm given the probability
of adoption. When a ﬁrm hires both types of workers, i.e., xH = xL = 1,
the amount of physical capital that maximizes ˜ V (k;1;1) is given by
˜ kP = a
·
(1 ¡ t)
(1 ¡ t) + ¯t
¸ 1
®
[Á´® + (1 ¡ Á)]
1
®:
Then, the expected proﬁt is
˜ V P ´ V (˜ kP;1;1) =
®
1 ¡ ®





(1 ¡ t) + ¯t
¸ 1
®
:When the ﬁrm hires only skilled workers, i.e., xH = 1 and xL = 0, the
amount of physical capital that maximizes ˜ V (k;1;0) is given by
˜ kS = a´
·
(1 ¡ t)




Then, the expected proﬁt is










Since we can show that the other hiring strategies are not optimal, as shown
in Lemma 1 in Acemoglu (1999), we can determine the optimal strategy of
the ﬁrm by comparing ˜ V P and ˜ V S. Since ˜ V P ¸ ˜ V H if and only if ´ · Γ(Á),
the result is proved.
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Pissarides, C.A. (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory: MIT Press.Table 1: Trends in earning dispersion (Males)(1980-1995): OECD (1996)
1980 1985 1990 1995
Canada D9/D5 1.67 (81) 1.68 (86) 1.75 1.73 (94)
D5/D1 2.07 (81) 2.40 (86) 2.28 2.18 (94)
Finland D9/D5 1.67 1.73 (86) 1.72 1.73 (94)
D5/D1 1.46 1.50 (86) 1.49 1.46 (94)
France D9/D5 2.03 2.08 2.13 2.13 (94)
D5/D1 1.66 1.61 1.62 1.61 (94)
Germany D9/D5 1.63 (83) 1.66 1.65 1.64 (93)
D5/D1 1.46 (83) 1.42 1.40 1.37 (93)
Italy D9/D5 1.43 1.53 (86) 1.55 (91) 1.65 (93)
D5/D1 1.63 1.44 (86) 1.43 (91) 1.60 (93)
Japan D9/D5 1.63 1.68 1.73 1.73 (94)
D5/D1 1.60 1.65 1.64 1.60 (94)
Sweden D9/D5 1.61 1.58 1.56 1.62 (93)
D5/D1 1.31 1.35 1.33 1.36 (93)
U.K. D9/D5 1.62 1.71 1.81 1.86
D5/D1 1.55 1.64 1.72 1.78
U.S. D9/D5 1.76 1.84 1.96 2.04
D5/D1 1.85 2.03 2.02 2.13
Table 1 is quoted from OECD (1996). D1 and D9 refer to the upper earnings
limits of the ﬁrst and ninth declies of employees ranked in order of their earnings
from the lowest to highest. D5 is deﬁned similarly and thus corresponds to median
earnings.Table 2: Tax rates on labor: Nickell et al. (2005)
1980-87 1988-1995 1996-2000
Canada 42 50 53
Finland 58 64 62
France 65 67 68
Germany (W) 50 52 50
Italy 56 67 64
Japan 33 33 37
Sweden 77 78 77
U.K. 51 47 44
U.S. 44 45 45
Table 2 is quoted from Table 4 in Nickell et al. (2005). The tax wedge is deﬁned
as the sum of the rates of consumption tax, income tax, and payroll tax.Table 3: Average literacy test scores by education level (1994): Nickell and
Layard (1999)
ISCED2 ISCED3 ISCED5 ISCED6/7 Total
Germany 2.42 2.97 3.11 3.39 2.84
Netherlands 2.52 2.96 n.a. 3.27 2.74
Sweden 2.96 3.07 3.31 3.56 3.04
Switzerland 2.20 2.82 3.09 3.16 2.67
Canada 2.20 2.67 2.97 3.55 2.62
U.S. 1.92 2.44 2.86 3.31 2.56
ISCED2, 3, 5, and 6/7 represent lower secondary, upper secondary, ﬁrst stage
of tertiary education, and second stage of tertiary education, respectively.
Table 4: Unemployment (Standardized Rate): Nickell et al. (2005)
1973-9 1980-7 1988-95 1996-9 2000-1 2002
Canada 6.9 9.7 9.5 8.7 7.0 7.7
Finland 4.1 5.1 9.9 12.2 9.4 9.1
France 4.3 8.9 10.5 11.9 8.9 8.7
Germany (W) 2.9 6.1 5.6 7.1 6.4 6.8
Italy 4.5 6.7 8.1 9.9 8.4 7.4
Japan 1.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 4.9 5.4
Sweden 1.6 2.3 5.1 8.7 5.3 4.9
U.K. 4.8 10.5 8.8 6.9 5.2 5.1

















Figure 2: Nash Equilibria